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Abstract
We study strong equilibria in symmetric capacitated cost-sharing connection games. In these
games, a graph with designated source 𝑠 and sink 𝑡 is given, and each edge is associated with
some cost. Each agent chooses strategically an 𝑠-𝑡 path, knowing that the cost of each edge
is shared equally between all agents using it. Two settings of cost-sharing connection games
have been previously studied: (i) games where coalitions can form, and (ii) games where edges
are associated with capacities; both settings are inspired by real-life scenarios. In this work we
combine these scenarios and analyze strong equilibria (profiles where no coalition can deviate)
in capacitated games. This combination gives rise to new phenomena that do not occur in the
previous settings. Our contribution is two-fold. First, we provide a topological characterization
of networks that always admit a strong equilibrium. Second, we establish tight bounds on the
efficiency loss that may be incurred due to strategic behavior, as quantified by the strong price
of anarchy (and stability) measures. Interestingly, our results are qualitatively different than
those obtained in the analysis of each scenario alone, and the combination of coalitions and
capacities entails the introduction of more refined topology classes than previously studied.
Keywords: network congestion games, cost-sharing games, network design games, strong price of
anarchy, strong equilibrium, coalitions, capacities, network topology
1 Introduction
The construction of networks by autonomous agents can be significantly affected by strategic be-
havior. These situations are frequently modeled as cost-sharing connection games, which have been
extensively studied [1, 3, 4, 9, 11]. For example, consider the construction of a large computer
network used by different countries, where each country is an autonomous system that serves its
own strategic interests.
In cost-sharing games, a network is given and each edge is associated with a cost. Each one
of 𝑛 agents wishes to construct a path between its source and sink nodes, where the cost of each
edge is shared equally between the agents who use it; each agent desires to minimize his individual
cost. Returning to our motivating example, a large computer network may be used by different
countries, which should jointly cover its cost. All countries wish to use the network links, but prefer
to do so at minimal cost.
*An earlier version of this work has appeared in the Proceedings of the 29th AAAI Conference on Artificial
Intelligence (AAAI-15). This work was partially supported by the European Research Council under the European
Union’s Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) / ERC grant agreement number 337122.
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Figure 1: A game with no SE
The analysis of these games evolved around the Nash equilibrium (NE) notion — a profile of
strategies in which no agent can benefit from a unilateral deviation. In recent years, two interesting
cases of these games have been considered, both inspired by real-life scenarios. First, a group of
agents may form a coalition and collaborate for the benefit of all the members in the coalition.
This scenario is formalized using the notion of a strong equilibrium (SE) [5]. A SE is a strategy
profile from which no coalition can deviate in a way that benefits each one of its members. Note
that we are considering non-cooperative games with non-transferable utilities. SE in cost-sharing
connection games have been studied in [9]. The second scenario considers capacity constraints on
the network edges [11]. Here, each edge is associated with some capacity that limits the number
of agents who can use it. Both scenarios can naturally occur in our motivating example. Indeed,
countries may collaborate to improve their standing, and capacity constraints may arise due to
bandwidth limits.
While each of these settings has been previously studied alone, the combination of the two
has not been previously considered. This is the focus of the present paper. Our main focus is
on symmetric games, where all agents share the same source and sink nodes. Interestingly, the
combination of coalitions and capacities gives rise to new phenomena that do not occur in any of
the previous scenarios.
Equilibrium existence. In the setting with no capacities or coalitions, the profile in which all
agents use the lowest-cost path from the source to the sink is clearly a NE. Now consider games with
coalitions or capacities. The profile just mentioned is clearly a SE as well, as no coalition can benefit
by deviating from the lowest-cost path. As for capacities, while capacity constraints may limit the
use of the lowest-cost path, it has been proven that every (feasible) capacitated game admits a NE,
due to the existence of an exact potential function [11]. Consider next the combination of coalitions
and capacities. Here, even the mere existence problem becomes non-trivial. Consider, for example,
the game depicted in Figure 1, played by two agents. In our figures we use the notation (𝑥, 𝑦) to
denote an edge with cost 𝑥 and capacity 𝑦. In this game, the unique NE (up to renaming of agents)
is one where one agent uses the upper edge (𝑎) at cost 1, and the other agent uses the path 𝑏, 𝑐 at
cost 1.3. However, this profile is not a SE, as the two agents can deviate to the paths 𝑏, 𝑐 and 𝑏, 𝑑,
respectively, at the respective costs of 0.7 and 1.1. Since every SE is also a NE, and the only NE
is not a SE, we conclude that this game does not admit a SE.
Efficiency loss. As another example, consider the efficiency loss incurred due to strategic be-
havior. The standard measure used to quantify the efficiency loss is the price of anarchy (PoA),
defined as the ratio between the cost of the worst-case NE and the optimal cost (where the social
cost is defined as the overall cost of the edges in use). In the game with no capacities or coalitions,
2
SPP and EP SP General
PoA
Uncap. 𝑛 𝑛 𝑛
Cap. 𝑛 𝑛 unbounded
SPoA
Uncap. 1 1 1
Cap. (*) 𝐻𝑛 𝑛 unbounded
SPoS Cap. (*) 𝐻𝑛 Θ(𝑛) unbounded
Table 1: A comparison between upper bounds for the PoA in different scenarios. Cap. and uncap.
are shorthands for capacitated and uncapacitated. Our results are marked with an asterisk (*). All
bounds are tight.
it has been shown that the PoA can be as bad as 𝑛 (i.e., the number of agents), and this is tight
[4]. The consideration of coalitions significantly reduces the loss; in fact, every SE is optimal. In
capacitated games, the PoA depends on the network topology. For example, if the network topology
adheres to a series-parallel structure (defined in Section 2.2), then the PoA is bounded by 𝑛. Do
coalitions reduce the efficiency loss in capacitated games as in their uncapacitated counterparts?
Interestingly, the answer is no for series-parallel networks, but the answer is affirmative for a smaller
set of topologies. Once again, the combination of coalitions and capacities introduces interesting
phenomena, and requires a more refined classification of network topologies than each setting alone.
1.1 Our Results
Equilibrium existence. As mentioned above, not all symmetric capacitated cost-sharing games
admit a SE. We provide a full characterization of network topologies that do admit a SE; i.e., every
game played on a topology in this class admits a SE, and for every topology not in this class, there
exists a game that does not possess a SE. The analysis of this part requires the introduction of a
new class of networks, which we refer to as Series of Parallel Paths (SPP) networks. This class is
defined as all networks that are the concatenation of parallel-path networks.
Efficiency loss. Previous analysis of the efficiency loss in cost-sharing games showed that the
network topology significantly affects the incurred loss. This observation is reinforced in this work,
as summarized below (see also Table 1 for a subset of our results). We provide tight bounds on the
strong price of anarchy (SPoA), defined as the ratio between the cost of the worst-case SE and the
optimal cost and on the strong price of stability (SPoS), defined analogously with respect to the
best-case SE.
Epstein et al. [9] establish an upper bound of 𝐻𝑛 (i.e., the 𝑛
𝑡ℎ harmonic number, which is
roughly log(𝑛)) on the SPoA in every game (including asymmetric games) that admits a SE. As
mentioned above, this result does not carry over to capacitated networks. However, we show that
this result does carry over to a specific class of network topologies, namely extension-parallel (EP)
and SPP networks. Moreover, we provide an example showing that this bound is tight. In series-
parallel (SP) networks, the SPoA is at most 𝑛 (follows from the upper bound on the PoA), and we
provide an example showing that this is tight. For general networks, we show that the SPoA can
be arbitrarily high, even in instances with only two agents. Interestingly, our analysis results in a
more refined classification of topologies than was required for the study of capacities or coalitions
alone, most notably in the distinction between subclasses of SP networks.
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In addition, we provide bounds on the SPoS. We show that the SPoS can also be as high as Ω(𝑛)
in SP networks and is unbounded in general networks. Interestingly, while the PoS is significantly
better than the PoA (1 versus 𝑛 in uncapacitated games, and an even wider gap in capacitated
games), in capacitated games we show that for all the topology classes we consider, the bounds on
the SPoS and SPoA are asymptotically the same. A natural interpretation of the PoS measure is
the loss that is incurred if there exists a coordinator who can suggest an initial configuration to the
agents. While a coordinator can sometimes reduce the efficiency loss, our results here imply that a
coordinator may not be useful in the worst case.
In addition to studying games with arbitrary capacity constraints, we consider the special case in
which all the edges have the same capacity. We show that limiting the capacities to be homogeneous
reduces the efficiency loss in games played on EP networks, in which every SE becomes a socially
optimal solution.
Extensions. We consider two natural extensions to our model. First, we consider asymmetric
games. Here, we provide a characterization of network topologies that always admit a SE, and
provide an example of a simple EP network for which the SPoA is unbounded. Second, we show
that all of our results regarding symmetric games extend to undirected networks as well.
1.2 Related Work
Since their introduction by Anshelevich et al. [4], cost-sharing connection games have been widely
studied in various settings. In the original setting that was studied in [4], the agents’ strategies
consist of the amounts each of one of them is willing to pay for each edge, and in order to use
an edge, the total amount that is paid for it should exceed its cost. This allows for general cost-
sharing mechanisms that are not necessarily fair. The special case of fair cost-sharing was studied
by Anshelevich et al. in [3]. Under the fair cost-sharing rule, the strategy of an agent simply
becomes a path in the graph, and the cost of each edge is shared equally between the agents who
use it. They observed that the fair connection game belongs to the more general class of congestion
games, which was introduced by Rosenthal [20]. In these games, a pure NE always exists, and they
are known to admit an exact potential function, as defined in [19].
The above works studied the inefficiency of equilibria by considering the measures of price of
anarchy (PoA) and price of stability (PoS). The PoA measure was introduced by Koutsoupias and
Papadimitriou [16] and has since been studied in numerous games and settings. In [4], it was shown
that the PoA in every cost-sharing connection game is at most 𝑛 (the number of agents). It was
also shown that the PoA can be as high as 𝑛 even in a simple network that consists of two parallel
edges. For fair cost-sharing games in directed networks, a tight upper bound of 𝐻𝑛 on the PoS
was established in [3] using the potential function of the game. In the case of undirected networks,
an upper bound of 𝑂( log𝑛log log𝑛) on the PoS in single-source games was established in [17]. In the
special case of broadcast games, in which there is a single source and each other node is the sink
node of a different agent, the PoS was shown to be a constant [7]. Lower bounds on the PoS in the
undirected case were studied in [6], where it was shown that the PoS can be as high as 348/155,
1.862, and 20/11 in general games, single-source games, and broadcast games, respectively.
The concept of a strong equilibrium — a strategy profile that is resilient to coalitional deviations
— was introduced by Aumann [5]. Epstein et al. [9] studied SE in fair and general cost-sharing
connection games. Their results showed that the network topology plays a major role in the
existence of a SE. For example, they showed that every single-source game that is played on a
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series-parallel graph has a SE, but this property does not hold for single-source games played on
general graphs. The existence of SE in the more general class of network congestion games was
studied in [13, 14], and also in [15], which established a characterization of the network topologies
that admit SE in congestion games with monotone cost functions.
For fair cost-sharing, Epstein et al. [9] and Albers [1] independently proved an upper bound
of 𝐻𝑛 on the strong price of anarchy (SPoA), which is the analogue of the PoA with respect to
SE. This upper bound holds for every game that has a SE, regardless of the network topology.
The SPoA measure was introduced in [2], and was also studied with respect to various additional
settings; see, e.g., [8, 12].
The consideration of edge capacities in cost-sharing games was first suggested by Feldman
and Ron [11]. They studied the PoA and PoS in symmetric games with regard to two objective
functions: the sum of costs of all agents and the maximum cost of an agent. Their work has further
emphasized the importance of the network topology. For example, when considering the sum of
costs objective function, the PoA is at most 𝑛 in games played on series-parallel networks, but can
be arbitrarily high in non-SP networks. A recent paper by Erlebach and Radoja [10] showed that
the PoS with respect to the max-cost objective function is at most 𝑛 (in symmetric games), closing
a gap that was presented in [11].
2 Model and Preliminaries
2.1 Symmetric Capacitated Fair Cost-Sharing Connection Games
A symmetric capacitated fair cost-sharing connection (CFCSC) game is given by a tuple
Δ = (𝑛,𝐺 = (𝑉,𝐸), 𝑠, 𝑡, {𝑝𝑒}𝑒∈𝐸 , {𝑐𝑒}𝑒∈𝐸)
where 𝑛 is the number of agents, 𝐺 = (𝑉,𝐸) is a directed graph, 𝑠, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑉 are the source and
sink nodes (respectively), and each edge 𝑒 ∈ 𝐸 is associated with a cost 𝑝𝑒 ∈ R≥0 and a capacity
constraint 𝑐𝑒 ∈ N∪{0}. Each agent wishes to construct an 𝑠-𝑡 path in 𝐺 while maintaining minimal
cost. The strategy space of agent 𝑗, denoted by Σ𝑗 , is the set of all 𝑠-𝑡 paths in 𝐺. The joint strategy
space is denoted by Σ = Σ1× . . .×Σ𝑛. The game is non-cooperative with non-transferable utilities.
Given a strategy profile 𝑠 = (𝑠1, . . . , 𝑠𝑛) ∈ Σ, the number of agents that use an edge 𝑒 in the
profile 𝑠 is denoted by 𝑥𝑒(𝑠) = |{𝑗|𝑒 ∈ 𝑠𝑗}|. A profile 𝑠 is said to be feasible if for every 𝑒 ∈ 𝐸,
𝑥𝑒(𝑠) ≤ 𝑐𝑒. A game is said to be feasible if it admits a feasible strategy profile. Throughout this
paper we only consider feasible games. When all the edges have the same capacity, we say that
the game has homogeneous capacities. Formally, in a game with homogeneous capacities, there is
a number 𝑐 ∈ N such that for every 𝑒 ∈ 𝐸, 𝑐𝑒 = 𝑐.
For a given strategy profile 𝑠 and a coalition 𝐶, the induced strategy profile on the agents of
the coalition 𝐶 is denoted by 𝑠𝐶 , and the strategy profile of the rest of the agents is denoted by
𝑠−𝐶 . We consider the fair cost-sharing mechanism, where the cost of each edge is shared equally
between all the agents who use it. The cost of agent 𝑗 in a strategy profile 𝑠 is
𝑝𝑗(𝑠) =
{︃∑︀
𝑒∈𝑠𝑗
𝑝𝑒
𝑥𝑒(𝑠)
if 𝑠 is feasible
∞ otherwise
We use the utilitarian objective function, that is, the social cost of a strategy profile 𝑠 is the
sum of costs of all agents, 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑠) =
∑︀
𝑗 𝑝𝑗(𝑠). The social cost of a profile is also equal to the sum
of costs of the edges in use.
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A strategy profile 𝑠 is a Nash equilibrium (NE) if no agent can improve her cost by deviating
to another strategy, i.e., for every 𝑗 and every strategy 𝑠′𝑗 ∈ Σ𝑗 , it holds that 𝑝𝑗(𝑠) ≤ 𝑝𝑗(𝑠′𝑗 , 𝑠−𝑗)
(where 𝑠−𝑗 denotes the strategy profile of all agents except 𝑗 in 𝑠). A strong equilibrium (SE) is
a strategy profile in which no coalition can deviate jointly in a way that will strictly decrease the
cost of every coalition member. Formally, a profile 𝑠 is a SE if for every coalition of agents 𝐶 and
every set of strategies 𝑠′𝐶 ∈ Σ𝐶 , there exists an agent 𝑗 ∈ 𝐶 such that 𝑝𝑗(𝑠) ≤ 𝑝𝑗(𝑠′𝐶 , 𝑠−𝐶). The
sets of NE and SE of a game Δ are denoted by 𝑁𝐸(Δ) and 𝑆𝐸(Δ), respectively.
We use the price of anarchy (PoA) and price of stability (PoS) measures to quantify the efficiency
loss incurred due to strategic behavior. Let 𝑠* be a strategy profile with minimal social cost in
a game Δ. Then, the PoA of Δ is the ratio between the cost of the worst-case NE and the cost
of 𝑠*, namely 𝑃𝑜𝐴 = max𝑠∈𝑁𝐸(Δ)
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑠)
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑠*) . Similarly, the PoS is the ratio between the cost of the
best-case NE and the cost of 𝑠*, namely 𝑃𝑜𝑆 = min𝑠∈𝑁𝐸(Δ)
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑠)
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑠*) . The analogues of the PoA and
PoS with respect to SE are named the strong price of anarchy (SPoA) and strong price of stability
(SPoS). Formally, 𝑆𝑃𝑜𝐴 = max𝑠∈𝑆𝐸(Δ)
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑠)
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑠*) and 𝑆𝑃𝑜𝑆 = min𝑠∈𝑆𝐸(Δ)
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑠)
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑠*) . For a family of
games, these measures are defined with respect to the worst case over all the games in the family.
2.2 Graph Theoretic Preliminaries
A symmetric network is a graph 𝐺 = (𝑉,𝐸) with two designated nodes, a source 𝑠 ∈ 𝑉 and a sink
𝑡 ∈ 𝑉 . Every node or edge in the network appears in at least one simple path from 𝑠 to 𝑡. The
networks we consider in this paper are directed unless stated otherwise. We hereby present three
important operations on symmetric graphs.
∙ Identification: Given a graph 𝐺 = (𝑉,𝐸), the identification of two nodes 𝑣1, 𝑣2 ∈ 𝑉 yields a
new graph 𝐺′ = (𝑉 ′, 𝐸′), where 𝑉 ′ = (𝑉 ∪ {𝑣})∖{𝑣1, 𝑣2} and 𝐸′ includes all the edges of 𝐸,
where each edge that was connected to 𝑣1 or 𝑣2 is now connected to 𝑣 instead. Figuratively,
the identification operation is the collapse of two nodes into one.
∙ Series composition: Given two symmetric networks, 𝐺1 = (𝑉1, 𝐸1) with 𝑠1, 𝑡1 ∈ 𝑉1 and
𝐺2 = (𝑉2, 𝐸2) with 𝑠2, 𝑡2 ∈ 𝑉2, the series composition 𝐺 = 𝐺1 → 𝐺2 is the network formed by
identifying 𝑡1 and 𝑠2 in the union network 𝐺
′ = (𝑉1 ∪ 𝑉2, 𝐸1 ∪𝐸2). In the composed network
𝐺, the new source is 𝑠1 and the new sink is 𝑡2.
∙ Parallel composition: Given two symmetric networks, 𝐺1 = (𝑉1, 𝐸1) with 𝑠1, 𝑡1 ∈ 𝑉1 and
𝐺2 = (𝑉2, 𝐸2) with 𝑠2, 𝑡2 ∈ 𝑉2, the parallel composition 𝐺 = 𝐺1 ‖ 𝐺2 is the network formed
by identifying the nodes 𝑠1 and 𝑠2 (forming a new source 𝑠) and the nodes 𝑡1 and 𝑡2 (forming
a new sink 𝑡) in the union network 𝐺′ = (𝑉1 ∪ 𝑉2, 𝐸1 ∪ 𝐸2).
Using these operations, we define three classes of network topologies that will be of interest
throughout the paper.
Definition 2.1. A symmetric network 𝐺 = (𝑉,𝐸) is a series-parallel (SP) network if it consists of
a single edge, or if there are two SP networks 𝐺1, 𝐺2 such that 𝐺 = 𝐺1 → 𝐺2 or 𝐺 = 𝐺1 ‖ 𝐺2.
Definition 2.2. A symmetric network 𝐺 = (𝑉,𝐸) is an extension-parallel (EP) network if one of
the following applies:
1. 𝐺 consists of a single edge.
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Figure 2: A game with no SE played on a Braess graph
2. There are two EP networks 𝐺1, 𝐺2 such that 𝐺 = 𝐺1 ‖ 𝐺2.
3. There is an EP network 𝐺1 and an edge 𝑒 such that 𝐺 = 𝐺1 → 𝑒 or 𝐺 = 𝑒→ 𝐺1.
Definition 2.3. A symmetric network 𝐺 is a Series of Parallel Paths (SPP) if there exist networks
𝐺1, . . . , 𝐺𝑘, each constructed by a parallel composition of simple paths, such that 𝐺 = 𝐺1 → . . .→
𝐺𝑘.
Note that every EP network is an SP network. An SPP network may or may not be an EP
network, but it is always an SP network. Examples of SPP, EP, SP, and non-SP networks appear
in Figures 11, 1, 6, and 2, respectively.
Finally, we have to define when a network is embedded in another network. A symmetric
network 𝐺 is embedded in a network 𝐺′ if 𝐺′ is isomorphic to 𝐺 or to a network derived from 𝐺
using any number of the following operations:
∙ Subdivision: replacing an edge (𝑢, 𝑣) by a new node 𝑤 and two edges (𝑢,𝑤) and (𝑤, 𝑣)
∙ Addition: adding a new edge connecting two existing nodes (including nodes that were added
using subdivision or extension)
∙ Extension: adding a new source or sink node and an edge connecting the new node with the
original source or sink node, respectively
3 Existence of Strong Equilibria
Every symmetric cost-sharing game admits a SE, as all agents can share the lowest-cost 𝑠-𝑡 path
[9]. In the capacitated version, it has been shown by Feldman and Ron [11] that a pure NE exists
in every feasible game, by establishing that the game admits a potential function. Therefore, the
consideration of capacities or coalitions alone does not preclude the existence of an equilibrium.
However, as was already observed in the introduction (recall Figure 1), capacitated games may not
admit any SE, even when played on a simple EP network (as shown in the example). We present an
additional example of a game that does not admit a SE, which is played on an underlying network
known as a Braess graph.
Example 1. Consider the game of two agents that is depicted in Figure 2. We show that each of
the possible strategy profiles is not a SE. If both agents use the path (𝑠, 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑡), one of the agents
can profit by deviating to (𝑠, 𝑎, 𝑡). If one agents uses (𝑠, 𝑎, 𝑡) and the other uses (𝑠, 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑡), it is
profitable for the latter to deviate to (𝑠, 𝑏, 𝑡). If one agent uses (𝑠, 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑡) and the other uses (𝑠, 𝑏, 𝑡),
the former can reduce her cost by using (𝑠, 𝑎, 𝑡) instead. A strategy profile in which one agent uses
(𝑠, 𝑎, 𝑡) and the other uses (𝑠, 𝑏, 𝑡) is a pure NE, but it is not a SE because both agents can reduce
their costs if they both use the path (𝑠, 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑡). We conclude that this game does not admit a SE.
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Algorithm 1 Compute a SE for a network of parallel edges
1. 𝑗 ← 1
2. While there are agents that have not been assigned edges:
(a) For every edge 𝑒 that has not been assigned to agents yet, compute its fractional cost
𝑝𝑒
min{𝑐𝑒,𝑛−
∑︀𝑗−1
𝑖=1 𝑛𝑖}
.
(b) Find the edge 𝑒 with the minimal fractional cost, and compute 𝑛𝑗 = min{𝑐𝑒, 𝑛−
∑︀𝑗−1
𝑖=1 𝑛𝑖}.
(c) Assign 𝑒 to the following 𝑛𝑗 agents:
∑︀𝑗−1
𝑖=1 𝑛𝑖 + 1, . . . ,
∑︀𝑗
𝑖=1 𝑛𝑖.
(d) Increment 𝑗.
As it turns out, the two networks depicted in Figures 1 and 2 are, roughly speaking, the
only barriers to SE existence. This is formalized in the remainder of this section as an exact
characterization of the network topologies that always admit a SE.
Definition 3.1. A symmetric network 𝐺 is said to admit a SE if every symmetric CFCSC game
played on 𝐺 admits a SE.
Recall that a symmetric network is defined as a graph with designated source and sink nodes.
According to the last definition, a network 𝐺 is said to admit a SE if every CFCSC game played on
𝐺 (i.e., for every assignment of costs and capacities to the edges, and for every number of agents)
admits a SE. Conversely, a network 𝐺 does not admit a SE if there exists an example of a game
played on 𝐺 that does not admit a SE. The following theorem establishes the characterization of
networks that admit a SE.
Theorem 3.2. A symmetric network 𝐺 admits a SE if and only if 𝐺 is an SPP network.
The proof is divided into two parts. In Theorem 3.3 we prove that every SPP network admits
a SE, and in Theorem 3.5 we establish the converse direction.
Theorem 3.3. Every SPP network admits a SE.
Proof. We first observe that in our context, networks of parallel paths can be reduced to networks
of parallel edges, where each path is replaced by an edge with capacity that equals the minimal
capacity on the path and cost that equals the total cost of the path. Therefore, it suffices to prove
the assertion of the theorem for networks constructed by series composition of parallel-edge graphs.
Our main building block in this proof is Algorithm 1, which computes a SE for games played
on parallel-edge networks. The algorithm assigns edges to agents in a greedy manner. It first finds
the edge with the lowest fractional cost (as defined in the description of the algorithm). When used
to its maximum capacity (or by all the agents), this edge has the lowest possible cost for a single
agent. The algorithm then assigns this edge to as many agents as possible. In the description of
the algorithm, the number of agents who use the first edge is denoted by 𝑛1. In each iteration, the
algorithm proceeds in the same way: it finds the edge with the lowest fractional cost that is still
available and assigns it to as many agents as possible (this number is limited by the capacity of the
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edge and the number of remaining agents). The number of agents who use the 𝑗𝑡ℎ edge is denoted
by 𝑛𝑗 . The algorithm terminates within at most 𝑛 steps.
As part of the proof, we show that the returned profile is a SE. An important property of
this algorithm is the entireness property : Each edge that is used by the algorithm is used to its
maximum capacity, except for the last edge that is chosen by the algorithm, which may or may not
be entirely used depending on the number of remaining agents. Moreover, the cost incurred due to
an edge is exactly its fractional cost in the iteration in which it was chosen, and the costs of the
agents are non-decreasing in the agents’ indices.
After defining Algorithm 1, we are ready to prove the theorem. Let 𝐺1, . . . , 𝐺𝑘 be parallel-edge
networks, and let 𝐺 be a series composition of these networks. We define a strategy profile 𝑠 for
the game played on 𝐺 in the following way: For every 𝑖 = 1, . . . , 𝑘, we compute a profile 𝑠𝑖 for
network 𝐺𝑖 using Algorithm 1. 𝑠 is defined to be the strategy profile in which the strategy of agent
𝑗 is the concatenation of his strategies in 𝑠1, . . . , 𝑠𝑘. We prove that 𝑠 is a SE.
From the definition of Algorithm 1, we get that for every profile 𝑠𝑖, and for every two agents
𝑗, 𝑗′ such that 𝑗 < 𝑗′, 𝑝𝑗(𝑠𝑖) ≤ 𝑝𝑗′(𝑠𝑖). In other words, the first agent in 𝑠 incurs the lowest cost in
each of 𝐺1, . . . , 𝐺𝑘, the next agent incurs the second lowest cost in each of the subnetworks, and so
on.
The intuition behind the proof is the following: Since the first agent pays the lowest possible
cost in each of the subnetworks, she cannot reduce her cost in any subnetwork and thus cannot
participate in any profitable coalitional deviation. Assuming that the first agent does not participate
in the deviation, the second agent cannot reduce her cost in any subnetwork and cannot participate
in the deviation as well. Arguments of this nature will be used to show that none of the agents can
participate in the coalitional deviation.
Formally, assume by contradiction that there is a coalition 𝐶 for which there is a profitable
deviation, yielding a strategy profile 𝑠′. Let 𝑗 be the minimal index of an agent in 𝐶, i.e., 𝑗 is the
agent that uses the 𝑗𝑡ℎ lowest-cost edge in each of 𝑠1, . . . , 𝑠𝑘.
In order for 𝑠′ to be a profitable coalitional deviation, 𝑗 must reduce her cost in at least one
of 𝐺1, . . . , 𝐺𝑘. Assume, without loss of generality, that after the coalition deviates to 𝑠
′, agent 𝑗
reduces her cost in 𝐺1. Denote the edge used by 𝑗 in 𝑠
1 by 𝑒. It follows that there exists an edge
𝑒′ in 𝐺1 such that
𝑝𝑒′
𝑥𝑒′(𝑠′)
<
𝑝𝑒
𝑥𝑒(𝑠)
.
First, we show that 𝑒′ ̸= 𝑒. From the last inequality, if 𝑒′ = 𝑒, the number of agents who use 𝑒
in 𝑠′ must be larger than the number of agents who use 𝑒 in 𝑠. We consider each of the edges that
are used in 𝑠1 and show that the number of agents who use it cannot increase after the deviation.
If 𝑒 is used to its maximum capacity, the number of agents who use it cannot increase. By the
entireness property of Algorithm 1, we know that the only edge in 𝑠1 that may not be entirely used
is the last edge that was picked by the algorithm. So if the edge 𝑒 that agent 𝑗 uses in 𝑠1 is the last
edge chosen by the algorithm, all the agents with higher indices must also use 𝑒 in 𝑠1. Particularly,
since 𝑗 is the agent with the minimal index in 𝐶, it follows that all the agents in the coalition use 𝑒
in 𝑠1. Therefore, the number of agents who use 𝑒 cannot increase after the deviation in this case as
well. We have shown that the number of agents who use 𝑒 in 𝑠′ cannot be larger than the number
of agents who use 𝑒 in 𝑠, and conclude that 𝑒′ ̸= 𝑒.
Second, we show that 𝑒′ cannot be one of the edges that are entirely used in 𝑠1. Since 𝑒′ ̸= 𝑒,
𝑒′ was picked by the algorithm either before or after the iteration in which 𝑗 was assigned an edge.
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Algorithm 1 picks edges in non-decreasing order of fractional cost, so agent 𝑗 can only reduce her
cost if 𝑒′ was picked by the algorithm before 𝑗 was assigned an edge. In that case, 𝑒′ is only used
by agents with indices lower than 𝑗. However, these agents do not participate in the deviation (𝑗 is
the agent with the minimal index in 𝐶), and 𝑗 cannot deviate to 𝑒′, which is used to its maximum
capacity. Therefore, 𝑒′ cannot be one of the edges that are entirely used in 𝑠1.
We are left with two options for edge 𝑒′:
1. 𝑒′ is partially used in 𝑠1 (i.e., 𝑒′ is the last edge that was chosen by Algorithm 1). Since
𝑒′ ̸= 𝑒, the edge that agent 𝑗 uses in 𝑠1 was picked by the algorithm before 𝑒′. So 𝑒′ is used in
𝑠1 only by agents indexed 𝑗 + 1 or higher. The only agents who may use 𝑒′ in 𝑠′ are agents
who use 𝑒′ in 𝑠1 or agents that belong to 𝐶. These two sets of agents only contain agents
with indices 𝑗 or higher, thus 𝑥𝑒′(𝑠
′) ≤ |{𝑗, . . . , 𝑛}| = 𝑛− 𝑗 + 1.
2. 𝑒′ is not used in 𝑠1. In this case, the agents who use 𝑒′ in 𝑠′ must be members of the coalition
𝐶 ⊆ {𝑗, . . . , 𝑛}. Therefore, 𝑥𝑒′(𝑠′) ≤ |{𝑗, . . . , 𝑛}| = 𝑛− 𝑗 + 1.
In both cases, we have shown that 𝑥𝑒′(𝑠
′) ≤ 𝑛− 𝑗 + 1, and since the number of agents who use
an edge is at most its capacity, 𝑥𝑒′(𝑠
′) ≤ min{𝑐𝑒′ , 𝑛 − 𝑗 + 1}. From the assumption that agent 𝑗
reduces her cost in 𝐺1, we get that
𝑝𝑒′
min{𝑐𝑒′ , 𝑛− 𝑗 + 1} ≤
𝑝𝑒′
𝑥𝑒′(𝑠′)
<
𝑝𝑒
𝑥𝑒(𝑠)
and the algorithm should have assigned 𝑒′ to agent 𝑗 (or a previous agent) instead of 𝑒. We get a
contradiction and conclude that 𝑠 is a SE.
We now prove the converse direction, namely that for every non-SPP network, there is a CFCSC
game played on it that does not admit a SE. The key lemma in our proof connects us back to the
two examples mentioned in the beginning of this section.
Lemma 3.4. A symmetric network is SPP if and only if it does not embed any of the networks
depicted in Figure 3.
Proof. We first show that every SPP network does not embed any of the networks of Figure 3.
Note that in a network of parallel paths, no node except for the source and the sink can have two
edges entering or leaving it. Thus, a network of parallel paths cannot embed any of the networks of
Figure 3. For an SPP network to embed one of the forbidden networks (the networks that appear
in the figure), at least one of its subnetworks of parallel paths has to embed a forbidden network,
which is impossible. We conclude that if a network is SPP, it cannot embed any of these networks.
In the converse direction, let 𝐺 be a network that does not embed any of the networks of Figure
3. We prove that 𝐺 is SPP. It is proven in [15] that a network is SP if and only if it does not
embed a Braess graph (Figure 3(a)). Therefore, 𝐺 is SP. The rest of the proof is by induction on
the height of the construction tree of 𝐺. The base case is a single edge, which is an SPP network.
The induction hypothesis states that every SP network that does not embed any of the forbidden
networks and has a construction tree with height smaller than that of 𝐺 is SPP.
Assume, by contradiction, that 𝐺 is not SPP. Since 𝐺 is SP, we know that either 𝐺 = 𝐺1 → 𝐺2
or 𝐺 = 𝐺1 ‖ 𝐺2. By induction, we can assume that both 𝐺1 and 𝐺2 are SPP (otherwise, one
of 𝐺1 and 𝐺2 is an SP network with smaller construction tree, that does not embed any of the
forbidden networks and is not an SPP network). The series composition of two SPP networks is an
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Figure 3: Minimal non-SPP networks
SPP network, so it is impossible that 𝐺 = 𝐺1 → 𝐺2. Hence, 𝐺 = 𝐺1 ‖ 𝐺2. If both of 𝐺1, 𝐺2 are
networks of parallel paths, their parallel composition is a network of parallel paths, which is SPP.
Therefore, one of 𝐺1, 𝐺2 embeds a series composition of a single edge and a parallel-edge network.
It follows that 𝐺 embeds one of the networks presented in Figure 3(b)-(c). It is a contradiction,
hence 𝐺 is SPP.
Using Lemma 3.4 we can now prove the following. The proof is similar to that of a lemma
proven in [11], and is specified here for completeness.
Theorem 3.5. For every non-SPP network 𝐺, there exists a symmetric CFCSC game played on
𝐺 that does not admit a SE.
Proof. By Lemma 3.4, if 𝐺 is not an SPP network, it must embed one of the networks depicted
in Figure 3. We define a game of two agents played on 𝐺. We start from one of the networks
presented in Figure 3 and assign costs and capacities as in Figures 1 and 2. The network 𝐺 is
derived from the forbidden network using the operations: subdivision, addition, and extension. We
show how to assign costs and capacities to the edges that are added in the process such that each
strategy profile in the new game corresponds to a strategy profile in the original game, which does
not admit a SE.
Formally, let Δ be a CFCSC game played on a network 𝐺, and let 𝐺′ be a network derived from
𝐺 by applying one of the operations: subdivision, addition, or extension. We construct a game Δ′
played on 𝐺′ that emulates Δ: We define a bijection 𝑓 from the strategy space of an agent in Δ to
the strategy space of an agent in Δ′, such that (𝑠1, . . . , 𝑠𝑛) is feasible whenever (𝑓(𝑠1), . . . , 𝑓(𝑠𝑛))
is feasible, and 𝑝𝑗(𝑠1, . . . , 𝑠𝑛) = 𝑝𝑗(𝑓(𝑠1), . . . , 𝑓(𝑠𝑛)) for every strategy profile (𝑠1, . . . , 𝑠𝑛). We do
not need to define different mappings between strategy spaces for different agents, as we consider
symmetric games and the strategy spaces of the agents are identical. We define Δ′ and the function
𝑓 for each one of the possible operations:
∙ Subdivision: If an edge 𝑒 is subdivided into 𝑒1 and 𝑒2, we set 𝑐𝑒1 = 𝑐𝑒2 = 𝑐𝑒, 𝑝𝑒1 = 𝑝𝑒, and
𝑝𝑒2 = 0. Given a strategy 𝑠𝑗 in Δ, 𝑓(𝑠𝑗) is the same path as 𝑠𝑗 where the edge 𝑒 is replaced
by the path (𝑒1, 𝑒2) (if 𝑒 /∈ 𝑠𝑗 , 𝑓(𝑠𝑗) = 𝑠𝑗). No strategy profile in Δ′ can use only one of 𝑒1, 𝑒2,
so 𝑓 is a bijection.
∙ Addition: If an edge 𝑒 connecting two existing nodes is added, we set its capacity to be 𝑐𝑒 = 0,
and define 𝑓(𝑠𝑗) = 𝑠𝑗 for every strategy 𝑠𝑗 . No strategy in Δ
′ can use the new edge, so 𝑓 is
a bijection.
∙ Extension: If the source or the sink are extended using a new edge 𝑒, we set 𝑐𝑒 = 𝑛 and
𝑝𝑒 = 0. Given a strategy 𝑠𝑗 , 𝑓(𝑠𝑗) uses the newly added edge 𝑒 concatenated to the path used
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in 𝑠𝑗 . Every strategy in Δ
′ must use the new edge 𝑒, concatenated to a path in Δ, so 𝑓 is a
bijection.
We claim that Δ′ does not admit a SE if and only if Δ does not admit a SE. Let 𝑠, 𝑠′ be
strategy profiles in Δ, and let 𝐶 be a coalition. The profile (𝑠′1, . . . , 𝑠′𝑛) is a profitable deviation
from (𝑠1, . . . , 𝑠𝑛) for 𝐶 in Δ, if and only if the profile (𝑓(𝑠
′
1), . . . , 𝑓(𝑠
′
𝑛)) is a profitable deviation
from (𝑓(𝑠1), . . . , 𝑓(𝑠𝑛)) for 𝐶 in Δ
′.
This concludes the proof of Theorem 3.2.
4 Strong Price of Anarchy
4.1 EP and SPP Networks
In this section we bound the strong price of anarchy (SPoA) in capacitated games that admit SE.
The following theorem establishes an upper bound on the SPoA for EP networks.
Theorem 4.1. For every symmetric CFCSC game played on an EP network, it holds that 𝑆𝑃𝑜𝐴 ≤
𝐻𝑛 (if a SE exists), and this bound is tight.
Proof. We first prove the upper bound. Epstein et al. [9] showed that 𝑆𝑃𝑜𝐴 ≤ 𝐻𝑛 for uncapacitated
cost-sharing games. In their proof, they used the fact that no coalition can beneficially deviate from
a strategy profile 𝑠 that is a SE (by definition). In particular, if some coalition 𝐶 deviates to its
corresponding profile in the socially optimal profile 𝑠*, then one of the agents in 𝐶 weakly prefers
the initial profile 𝑠 to the new profile (𝑠*𝐶 , 𝑠−𝐶). The desired bound is then derived by the obtained
inequalities for coalitions of sizes 𝑛, . . . , 1. The only barrier to applying the exact same technique
to capacitated games is the fact that the deviation into profile (𝑠*𝐶 , 𝑠−𝐶) might be infeasible due to
capacity constraints. Our key lemma in this section shows that for games played on EP networks
there always exists such a feasible deviation. The lemma is sufficient in order to prove the upper
bound on the SPoA. Note that there may be more than a single socially optimal profile, but we
have the freedom to choose one of them to be 𝑠*.
Lemma 4.2. Let 𝐺 be an EP network and 𝑠 be a SE in a symmetric CFCSC game played on 𝐺.
There exists a feasible strategy profile 𝑠* such that the cost of 𝑠* is minimal, and for every coalition
𝐶, the profile (𝑠𝐶 , 𝑠
*
−𝐶) is feasible.
The following lemma, which is due to Feldman and Ron [11], will be used in the proof.
Lemma 4.3. [11] Let 𝐺 be an SP network. Let 𝑠 be a feasible profile of 𝑘 agents in a game played
on 𝐺, and let 𝑠′ be a feasible profile of 𝑟 agents such that 𝑟 < 𝑘. There exists an 𝑠 − 𝑡 path in 𝐺
that is feasible together with the strategies of the 𝑟 agents in 𝑠′ and uses only edges that are used
in the profile 𝑠.
Proof of Lemma 4.2. Let 𝐺𝑂𝑃𝑇 be the subnetwork that contains only the edges that are used by
an optimal strategy profile, and let 𝑁 denote the set of agents. We first define a specific profile
𝑠* played on 𝐺𝑂𝑃𝑇 , and then prove that for every coalition 𝐶, the strategy profile (𝑠𝐶 , 𝑠*−𝐶) is
feasible. Since 𝐺 is EP, 𝐺𝑂𝑃𝑇 is also EP.
1 We define 𝑠* in two steps: First, we assign a strategy to
1This can observed by constructing 𝐺𝑂𝑃𝑇 using the same construction tree of 𝐺, excluding parallel composition
operations of subnetworks that all their edges are not used in 𝐺𝑂𝑃𝑇 .
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Algorithm 2 Choosing the optimal profile 𝑠*
Input: 𝐺𝑂𝑃𝑇 is a graph, 𝑁 is a set of agents, and 𝑠 is a strategy profile.
ChooseOptimalProfile(𝐺𝑂𝑃𝑇 , 𝑁 , 𝑠):
1. If 𝐺𝑂𝑃𝑇 = 𝑒, where 𝑒 is a single edge, return a strategy profile in which the edge 𝑒 is assigned
to all the agents in 𝑁 who use 𝑒 in 𝑠.
2. If 𝐺𝑂𝑃𝑇 = 𝐺1 ‖ 𝐺2:
(a) Let 𝑁𝑖 ⊆ 𝑁 be the set of agents that use an edge of 𝐺𝑖 (𝑖 = 1, 2).
(b) 𝑠1 ← 𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑒(𝐺1, 𝑁1, 𝑠)
(c) 𝑠2 ← 𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑒(𝐺2, 𝑁2, 𝑠)
(d) Return the union of the profiles: (𝑠1, 𝑠2).
3. If 𝐺𝑂𝑃𝑇 = 𝐺1 → 𝑒 or 𝐺𝑂𝑃𝑇 = 𝑒→ 𝐺1, where 𝑒 is an edge:
(a) 𝑠1 ← 𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑙𝑒(𝐺1, 𝑁, 𝑠)
(b) Each agent that has a strategy in 𝑠1 will also use the edge 𝑒.
(c) For any other agent that uses 𝑒 in 𝑠, attempt to find an available path in 𝐺1. If found,
assign it together with the edge 𝑒 to the agent.
(d) Return the profile that was defined in the last three steps.
∙ In case it is possible to represent 𝐺𝑂𝑃𝑇 as both 𝐺1 → 𝑒1 and 𝑒2 → 𝐺2, choose the
representation in which the edge 𝑒𝑖 is used by the maximal set of agents in 𝑠.
as many agents as possible using recursion (on the structure of 𝐺𝑂𝑃𝑇 ). Then, we use Lemma 4.3
to extend this set of strategies to a profile of all agents. The profile 𝑠* is defined using Algorithm 2,
which chooses a specific profile from all the optimal strategy profiles. The algorithm gets as input
the subnetwork 𝐺𝑂𝑃𝑇 that is used by an optimal profile and the strategy profile 𝑠, which is a SE.
It is important to note that the algorithm might possibly define a strategy profile only for a
subset of the agents. In step 2, 𝑁1 ∩𝑁2 = 𝜑, but it is possible that 𝑁1 ∪𝑁2 ⊂ 𝑁 (since 𝐺𝑂𝑃𝑇 is
a subnetwork of 𝐺). Therefore, by the end of step 2, it is possible that not all the agents in 𝑁 are
assigned a strategy. In step 3(c), it is also possible that not all the agents in 𝑁 will be assigned a
strategy (as an agent is assigned a strategy only if there is a path available in 𝐺1). Thus, we have
to extend this strategy profile to a feasible profile for all agents (using only edges from 𝐺𝑂𝑃𝑇 ).
We do so by applying Lemma 4.3 to the network 𝐺𝑂𝑃𝑇 , where 𝑠 is any strategy profile that uses
only edges from 𝐺𝑂𝑃𝑇 , and 𝑠
′ is the partial profile that was defined above. This provides a full
definition of the profile 𝑠*. Example 2 that follows this proof illustrates the definition of 𝑠*.
We claim that the profile 𝑠* satisfies the capacity constraints. In step 1 of the algorithm, an
edge is assigned to the same agents that use it in the feasible profile 𝑠 (due to the way 𝑁 is split in
step 2). In step 3, the edge 𝑒 is used only by agents that use it in 𝑠, and edges in 𝐺1 are assigned
in a way that satisfies the capacity constraints. Therefore, no edge exceeds its capacity.
Let 𝐶 be a coalition of agents. We prove that the strategy profile 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏 = (𝑠𝐶 , 𝑠
*
−𝐶) is feasible.
Let 𝑒 be an edge. Let 𝑀 denote the set of agents that use 𝑒 in 𝑠, and let 𝑀* denote the set of
agents that use 𝑒 in 𝑠*. The set of agents that use 𝑒 in 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏 is (𝑀 ∩ 𝐶) ∪ (𝑀* ∩ (𝑁∖𝐶)). If 𝑒
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Figure 4: [11] A game played on an EP network with 𝑃𝑜𝑆 = 𝐻𝑛1+𝜖
is used only in 𝑠, it cannot exceed its capacity in 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏, since 𝑀 ∩ 𝐶 ⊆ 𝑀 , and the profile 𝑠 is
feasible. The same applies to edges that are used only in 𝑠*. It remains to consider edges that are
used in both 𝑠 and 𝑠*. There are two types of edges in EP networks: ones that are added to the
graph through an extension of the source or sink, and all other edges. The algorithm assigns edges
of the former type to agents in step 3, and edges of the latter type in step 1.
If edge 𝑒 is used in both 𝑠 and 𝑠*, there are two cases:
1. If 𝑒 is assigned to agents in step 1 of the algorithm, then the set 𝑁 in this step contains all
the agents that use 𝑒 in 𝑠, namely, 𝑀 ⊆ 𝑁 , thus, 𝑀 ⊆ 𝑀* (𝑒 ∈ 𝑠𝑗 ⇒ 𝑒 ∈ 𝑠*𝑗 ). The set of
agents that use 𝑒 in 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏 is (𝑀 ∩𝐶)∪ (𝑀* ∩ (𝑁∖𝐶)) ⊆𝑀*. Since 𝑠* is feasible, then 𝑒 does
not exceed its capacity in 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏.
2. If 𝑒 is added to the network 𝐺𝑂𝑃𝑇 using extension of the source or the sink, the algorithm
assigns 𝑒 to agents in step 3. There are two sub-cases.
(a) In step 3(c), each agent that uses 𝑒 in 𝑠 was assigned a path in 𝐺1 in 𝑠
*. In that case,
𝑀 ⊆𝑀*. The set of agents that use 𝑒 in 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏 is (𝑀 ∩𝐶)∪ (𝑀*∩ (𝑁∖𝐶)) ⊆𝑀*. Since
𝑠* is feasible, we get that 𝑒 does not exceed its capacity in 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏.
(b) There is an agent that uses 𝑒 in 𝑠 but does not use 𝑒 and 𝐺1 in 𝑠
*. Due to the definition
of 𝑠*, there is no available path in 𝐺1. Therefore, no agent can be assigned a path in
𝐺1 later. Each agent that uses 𝑒 in 𝑠
* must use 𝐺1. Hence, no agents will be assigned
the edge 𝑒 after it is used in step 3 of the algorithm. Thus, 𝑀* ⊆𝑀 . The set of agents
that use 𝑒 in 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏 is (𝑀 ∩𝐶)∪ (𝑀* ∩ (𝑁∖𝐶)) ⊆𝑀 . Since 𝑠 is feasible, then 𝑒 does not
exceed its capacity in 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏.
We conclude that no edge exceeds its capacity in 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏.
We turn to discuss the tightness of the upper bound established by the previous lemma. Feldman
and Ron [11] show an example of a game with 𝑛 agents, in which the PoS is 𝐻𝑛1+𝜖 for every 𝜖 > 0.
Their example is included here as Figure 4. The only NE in this example is also a SE. This shows
that the upper bound of 𝐻𝑛 on the SPoA in EP networks is tight.
Example 2. Figure 5 provides an example that illustrates the definition of 𝑠*. Recall that Algo-
rithm 2 gets as input a SE (𝑠) and the subnetwork that is used by an optimal strategy profile
(𝐺𝑂𝑃𝑇 ). The algorithm is used to choose an optimal profile 𝑠
* from all possible optimal strategy
profiles that use only edges from 𝐺𝑂𝑃𝑇 . Figure 5(a) shows the strategies of 𝑛 = 6 agents in the
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Figure 5: An illustration of Algorithm 2
profile 𝑠, which is a SE. Figures 5(b)-(d) show the construction of 𝑠* over 𝐺𝑂𝑃𝑇 . Figure 5(b)
illustrates the case of parallel composition: The lower edge is used by agent 6 (as in profile 𝑠), and
we use the algorithm recursively in order to find a profile for agents 1, . . . , 5 who use the upper
subnetwork. Figure 5(c) shows the case of edge extension: The edge of cost 8 is a subnetwork that
was extended with the edge of cost 5. The edge of cost 8 is used by the agents 1, 2, 3 in 𝑠, hence it
will be used by the same agents in 𝑠*. The algorithm now defines which agents will use the edge of
cost 5. First of all, it has to be used by agents 1, 2, 3. We consider the rest of the agents that use
this edge in 𝑠. One of them (agent 4) can use the edge of cost 8, and the other (agent 5) can not.
Therefore, agent 4 is assigned the same path as agents 1, 2, 3, and the strategy of agent 5 is left
undefined. Figure 5(d) shows the final profile 𝑠*, after it was extended to all agents using Lemma
4.3.
Remark. Let 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 = max𝑒∈𝐸 𝑐𝑒 be the maximal capacity of an edge. In the case of capacitated
games, the bound of 𝐻𝑛 on the SPoA that was established in [9] can be slightly improved to 𝐻𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 .
In their proof, Epstein et al. used the potential function to bound the cost of every SE. For a SE
𝑠 and an optimal solution 𝑠*, they have shown that 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑠) ≤ Φ(𝑠*), where the potential function
Φ is defined by Φ(𝑠) =
∑︀
𝑒∈𝐸 𝑝𝑒 ·𝐻𝑥𝑒(𝑠) (where 𝑥𝑒(𝑠) is the number of agents who use edge 𝑒 in
𝑠). When capacity constraints are added, in every feasible profile 𝑠 it holds that 𝑥𝑒(𝑠) ≤ 𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥.
Therefore, we can bound the cost of every SE by Φ(𝑠*) ≤∑︀𝑒∈𝐸 𝑝𝑒 ·𝐻𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝐻𝑐𝑚𝑎𝑥 · 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡(𝑠*).
The following theorem extends the class of networks for which the SPoA is bounded by 𝐻𝑛.
Theorem 4.4. For every symmetric CFCSC game played on a network that is a series composition
of EP networks, it holds that 𝑆𝑃𝑜𝐴 ≤ 𝐻𝑛 (if a SE exists).
Proof. Let 𝐺 = 𝐺1 → 𝐺2 → . . . → 𝐺𝑘 be a network. It is sufficient to prove that the SPoA
of a game played on 𝐺 is upper bounded by the maximal SPoA of a game played on one of the
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Figure 6: A game played on an SP network with 𝑆𝑃𝑜𝐴 ≥ 𝑛1+𝜖
subnetworks 𝐺1, . . . , 𝐺𝑘. Denote by 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐺𝑖(𝑠) the social cost of the strategy profile 𝑠 in a game
played only on the subnetwork 𝐺𝑖, and let 𝑠
* be an optimal profile. For every strategy profile 𝑠, it
holds that
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐺(𝑠) = 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐺1(𝑠) + . . .+ 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐺𝑘(𝑠).
If 𝑠 is a SE in 𝐺, the induced strategy profile in 𝐺𝑖 is also a SE. We get that
𝑆𝑃𝑜𝐴(𝐺) = max
𝑠 is SE
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐺(𝑠)
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐺(𝑠*)
= max
𝑠 is SE
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐺1(𝑠) + . . .+ 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐺𝑘(𝑠)
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐺1(𝑠
*) + . . .+ 𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐺𝑘(𝑠*)
≤ max
𝑠 is SE
max
𝑖
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐺𝑖(𝑠)
𝑐𝑜𝑠𝑡𝐺𝑖(𝑠
*)
≤ max
𝑖
𝑆𝑃𝑜𝐴(𝐺𝑖).
Note that SPP networks are a special case of the class specified in the last theorem, and therefore
the upper bound of 𝐻𝑛 applies to SPP networks as well.
4.2 SP and General Networks
For SP networks, it is established in [11] that 𝑃𝑜𝐴 ≤ 𝑛, which directly implies that 𝑆𝑃𝑜𝐴 ≤ 𝑛.
We provide an example showing that this bound is tight.
Theorem 4.5. For every 𝜖 > 0, there exists an SP network 𝐺 and a CFCSC game played on 𝐺
such that 𝑆𝑃𝑜𝐴 ≥ 𝑛1+𝜖 .
Proof. Consider the game played by 𝑛 agents on the graph depicted in Figure 6. The strategy
profile in which each agent uses a different edge of cost 1 and 𝑛 − 1 additional edges of cost 0 is
a SE: In this profile, each agent pays 1, and the only way to reduce this cost is by using a path
of edges that cost 0. However, the edges that cost 0 are already used to their maximum capacity,
and any deviation that allows an agent to use a path that costs 0 will increase the cost of another
agent.
The optimal profile in this game is the profile where one agent uses the lower edge of cost 1+ 𝜖
and 𝑛− 1 agents use the upper edges of cost 0. It follows that 𝑆𝑃𝑜𝐴 ≥ 𝑛1+𝜖 , as stated.
For general networks, the SPoA can be arbitrarily high, even with only two agents.
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Figure 7: A game with unbounded SPoA
Theorem 4.6. For every real number 𝑅, there exists a CFCSC game with two agents in which the
SPoA is greater than 𝑅.
Proof. Consider the game played by two agents on the graph presented in Figure 7. The strategy
profile in which no agent uses the inner edges is a SE: The agent that uses the upper path incurs
the lowest possible cost and will not participate in any deviation, while the other agent uses the
only path that is still available. However, the optimal strategy profile will avoid the edge of cost
24𝑅. Thus, 𝑆𝑃𝑜𝐴 ≥ 24𝑅+524 > 𝑅.
4.3 Homogeneous Capacities
We consider a more restricted form of capacity constraints, in which all the edges have the same
capacity. In this special case, we show that every SE in games played on EP networks is optimal.
Theorem 4.7. For every feasible symmetric CFCSC game with homogeneous capacities played on
an EP network, it holds that 𝑆𝑃𝑜𝐴 = 1.
Proof. Let Δ be a feasible symmetric game played on an EP network 𝐺, and denote by 𝑐 the
capacity of the edges. We show that every SE in Δ is optimal. We first show that there is a game
that is played on a network of parallel edges, such that every SE in that game is optimal if and only
if every SE in Δ is optimal. Let 𝐺1, . . . , 𝐺𝑘 be EP networks such that 𝐺 = 𝐺1 ‖ 𝐺2 ‖ . . . ‖ 𝐺𝑘, and
none of 𝐺1, . . . , 𝐺𝑘 can be represented as a parallel composition of two networks. Since 𝐺𝑖 is an
EP network, and cannot be decomposed into two parallel subnetworks, 𝐺𝑖 must be a single edge or
an EP network that is extended by a single edge. It follows that in every strategy profile, no more
than 𝑐 agents can use edges that belong to 𝐺𝑖. If 𝐺𝑖 is a single edge, its capacity is 𝑐, and if 𝐺𝑖 is
an EP network extended by a single edge 𝑒, every agent that uses edges from 𝐺𝑖 must also use 𝑒,
which has a capacity of 𝑐 agents.
Next, we claim that in every SE, all the agents that use edges from 𝐺𝑖 use the same path, which
is the lowest-cost path in 𝐺𝑖 (if there is more than one path with minimal cost, one of these paths
will be shared by all the agents). If there are agents who use a path of higher cost in 𝐺𝑖, they
can deviate to the lowest-cost path and reduce their costs. This deviation satisfies the capacity
constraints, as at most 𝑐 agents use edges from 𝐺𝑖, and the capacity of all the edges in the path is
𝑐.
Using the last observation, we can look at a different game, that is played on a network of parallel
edges, and that every SE in Δ corresponds to a SE in the new game. For each of 𝐺1, . . . , 𝐺𝑘, we
compute the minimum cost of an 𝑠-𝑡 path that goes through that subnetwork, and replace the
subnetwork with an edge that has that cost and a capacity of 𝑐 agents. Given a SE in the original
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game, we construct a strategy profile for the new game, such that the agents who use the minimal
cost path in 𝐺𝑖 will use the edge that replaced 𝐺𝑖 in the new network. The costs of these two
strategy profiles are the same for each agent.
It is only left to show that when all the capacities are equal, every SE in a game played on a
network of parallel edges is optimal. Let 𝑠 be a SE in a game played on a network of parallel edges,
where the capacity of each edge is 𝑐. Denote by 𝑒 the edge that has the maximal cost of all the
edges that are used in 𝑠. Assume (by contradiction) that there is another edge 𝑒′, such that 𝑝𝑒′ < 𝑝𝑒
(𝑒′ is cheaper) and 𝑥𝑒′(𝑠) < 𝑐 (𝑒′ is available). The number of agents who can deviate from 𝑒 to 𝑒′
is at most min{𝑥𝑒(𝑠), 𝑐− 𝑥𝑒′(𝑠)}. If this number of agents deviate to 𝑒′, their cost will reduce from
𝑝𝑒
𝑥𝑒(𝑠)
to at most
𝑝𝑒′
𝑥𝑒(𝑠)
. This contradicts our assumption that 𝑠 is a SE. Therefore, every SE uses⌈︀
𝑛
𝑐
⌉︀
edges of minimal total cost, as does the optimal solution. We conclude that 𝑆𝑃𝑜𝐴 = 1.
By applying the same arguments used in the proof of Theorem 4.4, the last result can be
extended to every network that is a series composition of EP networks, particularly, SPP networks.
Corollary 4.8. For every feasible symmetric CFCSC game with homogeneous capacities, that is
played on a network that is a series composition of EP networks, it holds that 𝑆𝑃𝑜𝐴 = 1.
When considering more general networks, limiting the capacities to be homogeneous does not
improve the SPoA. In the example presented in the proof of Theorem 4.5, which shows that the
SPoA in SP networks can be arbitrarily close to 𝑛, we can replace each edge that costs 0 with 𝑛−1
parallel edges that cost 0 and have unit capacity. This way all the edges have unit capacity, and
the theorem still holds for homogeneous capacities. In the example that shows that the SPoA can
be unbounded (in non-SP networks), all the edges already have unit capacities.
5 Strong Price of Stability
In some cases, the best SE may be of interest as well, for example, if there exists a central entity
that can coordinate the agents around an initial equilibrium. Clearly, it always holds that 𝑃𝑜𝑆 ≤
𝑆𝑃𝑜𝑆 ≤ 𝑆𝑃𝑜𝐴 (since every SE is a NE), so the upper bounds on the SPoA apply to the SPoS as
well. Interestingly, the upper bounds on the SPoS in all the classes of network topologies considered
here match the upper bounds on the SPoA. This is in stark contrast to previous settings, which
exhibited large gaps between worst-case and best-case equilibria. In what follows, we show that
all the upper bounds on the SPoA established in the previous section are tight with respect to the
best SE.
For EP and SPP networks, the bound of 𝐻𝑛 is tight with respect to the best SE due to an
example provided in [11], in which 𝑃𝑜𝑆 = 𝐻𝑛1+𝜖 for every 𝜖 > 0. The example appears here in the
proof of Theorem 4.1 (see Figure 4).
For SP networks, we have shown that 𝑆𝑃𝑜𝐴 ≤ 𝑛, and the following theorem shows a game for
which 𝑆𝑃𝑜𝑆 = Ω(𝑛).
Theorem 5.1. There exists a symmetric CFCSC game played on an SP network, in which the
SPoS is at least Ω(𝑛).
Proof. Consider the game of 𝑛 agents depicted in Figure 8. We divide the network into two parts.
The first part, which we refer to as the upper part of the network, contains the paths that go from
𝑠 to 𝑡 through the nodes 𝑣1, . . . , 𝑣𝑛−2. In the upper subgraph, there are 𝑛 − 1 edges that cost 0
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Figure 8: A game played on an SP network with 𝑆𝑃𝑜𝑆 = Θ(𝑛)
and 𝑛− 1 edges that cost 1. The second part, which we refer to as the lower part of the network,
contains the edge connecting 𝑠 and 𝑡 directly, and the two paths that go from 𝑠 to 𝑡 through node
𝑢. The upper part of the network can be used by at most 𝑛− 1 agents, so one of the agents must
use the lower part of the network.
We show that the only SE in this game are profiles in which each agent pays 1: 𝑛−1 agents use
the upper part of the network. Each one of them uses a different edge of cost 1 and 𝑛− 2 edges of
cost 0. The last agent uses the edge that goes directly from 𝑠 to 𝑡 and costs 1. We show that these
profiles are SE by considering the possibly profitable deviations. There are two possible paths that
cost less than 1. The first such path requires the agent to share the edge (𝑠, 𝑢) with another agent,
and then use the left edge (𝑢, 𝑡). However, a deviation of this kind would require another agent to
use the path (𝑠, 𝑢, 𝑡) that goes through the right edge (𝑢, 𝑡). That path costs 1 + 𝜖2 , and the agent
using it could not benefit from the deviation. The other path that costs less than 1 is the path that
goes only through the edges that cost 0. However, these edges are used to their maximum capacity,
and any coalitional deviation that allows an agent to use a path of cost 0 will not be profitable for
one of the participating agents. Since there are no profitable deviations, the profiles are SE, and
their social cost is 𝑛.
Now, we show that all other profiles are not SE. In every other profile in which only one agent
uses the lower subgraph, one of the agents who use the upper part of the network pays at least 2.
This agent can deviate to one of the lower paths and reduce her cost. Therefore, these profiles are
not SE. Every profile in which there are two agents using the lower subgraph cannot be a SE either.
In such profiles, the agents that use the upper part of the network will only use the edges that cost
0 and will not participate in any deviation. The remaining two agents always have a profitable
deviation: In every NE, one of them will use the edge (𝑠, 𝑡) that costs 1. However, this agent’s cost
can be reduced by sharing the edge (𝑠, 𝑢) with the other agent, so that one of them pays 1+𝜖2 and
the other pays 1 + 𝜖2 instead of 1 + 𝜖. It remains to prove that the profiles in which three agents
use the lower subgraph are not SE, but these are not even NE, as one of the agents can benefit by
deviating to a path consisting of edges of cost 0.
So far we have shown that the social cost of every SE is 𝑛. The optimal profile uses the edges
that cost 0, and the two paths that go through node 𝑢. The social cost of this profile is 1.5 + 𝜖,
hence it holds that 𝑆𝑃𝑜𝑆 = 𝑛1.5+𝜖 = Ω(𝑛).
Next, we show that in the case of non-SP networks, the SPoS can be unbounded (as shown for
the SPoA).
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Figure 9: A game with unbounded SPoS
Theorem 5.2. There exists a symmetric CFCSC game with two agents in which the SPoS can be
arbitrarily high.
Proof. Consider the game of two agents presented in Figure 9. The following strategy profile is a
SE: One agent uses the path (𝑠, 𝑒, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑏, 𝑡) and incurs the cost 0.6, and the other agent uses the
path (𝑠, 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑡) and incurs the cost 𝑅 + 1.3. This is a SE since the first agent incurs the minimal
possible cost, and the other agent uses the only available path. We claim that this is the only SE.
In every NE, it is impossible that two agents will use the edge (𝑠, 𝑎), as one of them incurs a
cost of at least 1.1, and therefore may deviate to the path (𝑠, 𝑒, 𝑡). Hence, one agent must use the
edge (𝑠, 𝑎) and the other must use the edge (𝑠, 𝑒).
If one agent uses the path (𝑠, 𝑒, 𝑡), using the path (𝑠, 𝑎, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑏, 𝑡) minimizes the cost of the other
agent. This strategy profile is not a SE, as they can jointly deviate to the paths (𝑠, 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑡) and
(𝑠, 𝑎, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑡), respectively, and both agents will benefit from the deviation.
We obtain that in every SE one agent must use the path (𝑠, 𝑒, 𝑐, 𝑑). This agent will not use the
path (𝑠, 𝑒, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑡), as he can use the better path (𝑠, 𝑒, 𝑡). The agent will not use the edge that costs
𝑅 for the same reason.
We conclude that the only SE is the one presented above. This SE uses the edge that costs 𝑅.
An optimal strategy profile will avoid that edge, as 𝑅 can be arbitrarily high. Therefore, the SPoS
is unbounded, as stated.
6 Extensions
6.1 Asymmetric Games
A natural extension of our model is the case of asymmetric games, where different agents are
associated with different source and sink nodes. In this section we remark on the existence of
SE and their quality in asymmetric games. Note that we still consider games that are played on
networks with designated source and sink nodes (as defined earlier), but the source and sink nodes
of network do not necessarily serve as the source and sink of the individual agents.
Regarding the existence of SE, Epstein et al. [9] provided an example of an asymmetric game
played on an SPP network that does not admit a SE. The following two theorems provide a
characterization of the networks that admit a SE: one theorem considers games with a single
source and the other considers games with multiple source nodes. The proofs are deferred to the
appendix.
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Figure 10: An asymmetric game with unbounded SPoA
Theorem 6.1. In single-source games, a symmetric network 𝐺 admits a SE if and only if it is
SPP.
Theorem 6.2. In games with multiple source and sink nodes, a symmetric network 𝐺 admits a
SE if and only if there are networks 𝐺1, . . . , 𝐺𝑘 such that 𝐺 = 𝐺1 → 𝐺2 → . . .→ 𝐺𝑘, and that one
of 𝐺1, . . . , 𝐺𝑘 is a network of parallel paths and the rest are networks of parallel edges.
Next we study the SPoA in asymmetric games. Unlike the symmetric case, which exhibited
reasonable bounds for some families of topologies, in the asymmetric case, even if all agents share
the same source (but not the same sink) and play a game on a simple EP network, the SPoA may
be unbounded.
Example. Consider the game played by two agents that is presented in Figure 10. The source node
of both agents is 𝑠, and the sink nodes are 𝑡1 and 𝑡2, respectively. The strategy profile in which
agent 1 uses the edge of cost 𝑅 and agent 2 uses the path of cost 0 is a SE. In the optimal profile,
agent 1 uses the edge of cost 0, and agent 2 uses the edge of cost 1. Therefore, in this example
𝑆𝑃𝑜𝐴 = 𝑅, which can be arbitrarily high.
However, for the class of SPP networks, the SPoA is upper bounded by 𝐻𝑛, even for asymmetric
games.
Theorem 6.3. For every CFCSC game (either symmetric or asymmetric) played on an SPP
network, it holds that 𝑆𝑃𝑜𝐴 ≤ 𝐻𝑛 (if a SE exists).
The proof is deferred to the appendix.
6.2 Undirected Graphs
Up until now we considered the case of cost-sharing games played on a directed graphs. In this
section we show that our results (for symmetric games) extend to undirected graphs.
For directed graphs we have shown that a network admits a SE if and only if it is an SPP
network. Theorem 3.3 asserts that every SPP network admits a SE. To prove existence we use a
greedy algorithm for assigning edges to agents, such that in every coalition, there must exist an
agent that cannot reduce his cost in any subnetwork of parallel edges. The same algorithm can be
used to compute a SE in the undirected case (due to exactly the same arguments). In the converse
direction, we presented two examples of games played on directed graphs that admit no SE. These
games admit no SE also in the case where the underlying graph is undirected. To complete the
argument we note that the lemma that is used to extend these forbidden networks to networks that
embed them applies to undirected graphs following an identical analysis.2
For bounding the SPoA and the SPoS in EP and SP networks, we use the following claim.
2In the undirected case, we use the characterization of SP networks shown by Milchtaich [18].
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Claim 6.4. Let Δ be a symmetric CFCSC game played on a directed SP network 𝐺, and let Δ′ be
the same game played on the same network but with undirected edges. If 𝑠 is a SE in Δ′, then Δ
has a SE with the same social cost as in 𝑠.
Proof. Let 𝑠 be a SE in Δ′. We first claim that we can assume, without loss of generality, that 𝑠
uses only acyclic paths. To see this note that the paths in 𝑠 cannot contain cycles that cost more
than 0, as if one of them did, the agent using that path could reduce her cost by removing the cycle.
In addition, it can be assumed that the paths in 𝑠 do not contain cycles that cost 0, as removing
these cycles does not affect the agent costs. To conclude the proof, we use the following lemma,
established by Milchtaich [18].
Lemma 6.5. [18] Let 𝐺 be an undirected SP network, and let 𝑢, 𝑣 be two distinct vertices in 𝐺.
If there exists an acyclic 𝑠-𝑡 path in which 𝑢 precedes 𝑣, then 𝑢 precedes 𝑣 in every acyclic 𝑠-𝑡 path
that contains both vertices.
By the above lemma, it follows that every edge used in the strategy profile 𝑠 (in the game Δ′)
is used in the direction determined by 𝐺. Each edge (𝑢, 𝑣) in the directed SP network 𝐺 can be
used as part of an acyclic path in 𝐺, and the lemma guarantees that if 𝑢, 𝑣 are both reached in a
path in 𝑠, 𝑢 precedes 𝑣. Therefore, 𝑠 is a valid strategy profile in Δ. Clearly, any deviation that is
feasible in Δ is also feasible in Δ′; therefore the profile 𝑠 is a SE in Δ as well.
The above claim implies that the set of SE in the undirected case is a subset of the set of SE in
the directed case (up to cycles of cost 0). Therefore, upper bounds on the SPoA in games played on
directed SP networks carry over to the undirected case. In addition, the examples that are used to
show that these upper bounds are tight (or that the SPoA can be unbounded in general networks)
hold when the edges are undirected as well. In the case of games with homogeneous capacities
that are played on EP and SPP networks, we have shown that every SE is optimal, and this result
carries over to the undirected case (by the above claim).
The upper bounds on the SPoS are derived from the fact that 𝑆𝑃𝑜𝑆 ≤ 𝑆𝑃𝑜𝐴, and we have
shown that these bounds are asymptotically tight. The examples that are used to show that
these upper bounds are tight still hold when the edges are undirected (the analysis of the game
with unbounded SPoS appears in the appendix). This completes the extension of our results for
symmetric games to the case of undirected graphs.
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A Omitted Proofs
Proof of Theorem 6.1. One direction has already been proven in Section 3: For every non-SPP
network, we have shown that there is a symmetric CFCSC game played on it that does not admit
a SE. We now show that every single source game played on an SPP network admits a SE.
Let Δ be a single source game played on an SPP network 𝐺. We denote the common source
node by 𝑠 and the sink node of agent 𝑗 by 𝑡𝑗 . By the definition of SPP networks, 𝐺 is series
composition of networks of parallel paths. Let 𝐺1, . . . , 𝐺𝑘 be networks of parallel paths such that
𝐺 = 𝐺1 → 𝐺2 → . . .→ 𝐺𝑘. For now, we assume that 𝑠 is the source node of 𝐺1.
Consider the sink node of agent 𝑗. That node must be either an inner node or a sink node of
one of the subnetworks 𝐺1, . . . , 𝐺𝑘. Assume that 𝑡𝑗 is an inner node or the sink of subnetwork 𝐺𝑖.
Now let us look at a path from 𝑠 to 𝑡𝑗 . Since the graph is directed, any path from 𝑠 to 𝑡𝑗 does
not use edges from subnetworks 𝐺𝑖+1, . . . , 𝐺𝑘. In addition, any path from 𝑠 to 𝑡𝑗 can be divided
into 𝑖 subsequent parts. The first 𝑖 − 1 parts are paths from the source to the sink of each of the
subnetworks 𝐺1, . . . , 𝐺𝑖−1. The last part is a path from the source node of 𝐺𝑖 to 𝑡𝑗 . If 𝑡𝑗 is an inner
node of 𝐺𝑖, there is only one path from the source of 𝐺𝑖 to 𝑡𝑗 .
We have seen that the sink node of an agent determines whether edges from a subnetwork 𝐺𝑖
can be part of her path. Without loss of generality, we assume that the agents are ordered in a way
that agents who use more subnetworks of 𝐺1, . . . , 𝐺𝑘 come first. Formally, for every two agents
𝑗1, 𝑗2, such that 𝑡𝑗1 is an inner node or the sink node of 𝐺𝑖1 and 𝑡𝑗2 is an inner node or the sink
node of 𝐺𝑖2 , if 𝑗1 < 𝑗2, then: (i) 𝑖1 ≥ 𝑖2, (ii) if 𝑡𝑗1 is an inner node and 𝑡𝑗2 is not an inner node,
then 𝑖1 > 𝑖2.
Now we define a strategy profile 𝑟 and show that it is a SE. The definition of the profile uses
Algorithm 1 in a similar way to the proof of Theorem 3.3. The profile 𝑟 is defined in two steps.
First, if agent 𝑗’s sink node is an inner node of subnetwork 𝐺𝑖, every path from 𝑠 to 𝑡𝑗 uses the
same edges in 𝐺𝑖, so we assign these edges to the agent. This is only a part of agent 𝑗’s path,
and the rest of her path is determined in the next step. In the next step, we iterate through the
subnetworks 𝐺1, . . . , 𝐺𝑘. When subnetwork 𝐺𝑖 is considered, we determine how many agents need
to be assigned a path from the source node to the sink node of 𝐺𝑖, and compute these paths using
Algorithm 1. The algorithm is stated for edges, but as in the proof of Theorem 3.3, each path can
be replaced by an equivalent edge that sums the costs of the edges in the path and has the minimal
available capacity of these edges. Then, we assign each of the paths returned by the algorithm to
the agents according to their order: The first agent 𝑗1 who needs to be assigned a path in 𝐺𝑖 gets
the lowest-cost path returned by the algorithm. Then, the second agent 𝑗2 > 𝑗1 who needs a path
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in 𝐺𝑖 is assigned the second lowest-cost path, and we continue the same way until all the paths
returned by the algorithm are assigned. This completes the definition of 𝑟.
We claim that the strategy profile 𝑟 is a SE. Assume by contradiction that there is a coalition
𝐶 for which deviating to another profile is profitable, and let 𝑗 be the minimal index of an agent
in 𝐶. Agent 𝑗 must reduce the cost that she pays for the edges in at least one of the subnetworks
𝐺1, . . . , 𝐺𝑘.
For each 𝐺𝑖, agent 𝑗 can reduce her cost in 𝐺𝑖 by moving to another path, or by sharing the cost
of her path with another agent that deviates to that path. As in the proof of Theorem 3.3, agent
𝑗 cannot use another path in a profitable deviation, as if there were such a path, the algorithm
would have assigned that path to 𝑗 earlier. So after the deviation, agent 𝑗 must share her path in
𝐺𝑖 with more agents compared to the original profile 𝑟. There are two cases:
1. Agent 𝑗’s path reaches the sink node of 𝐺𝑖. In that case, either agent 𝑗’s path in 𝐺𝑖 has an
edge 𝑒 that is used by 𝑐𝑒 agents, or the path is used by agents 𝑗, . . . , 𝑛. If the path contains
an edge 𝑒 that is used by 𝑐𝑒 agents in 𝑟, the path cannot be used by more than 𝑐𝑒 agents
after the deviation. If the path is already used by agents 𝑗, . . . , 𝑛, no other agents can join
the path, since 𝑗 = min𝐶. In both cases, the cost of agent 𝑗 in 𝐺𝑖 does not decrease.
2. Agent 𝑗’s sink node is an inner node of 𝐺𝑖. In that case, the only agents who can join agent
𝑗’s path in 𝐺𝑖 are agents who reach the sink node of 𝐺𝑖. However, the agents are ordered so
that all the agents who reach the sink node of 𝐺𝑖 are indexed lower than 𝑗. These agents do
not participate in the deviation, and we conclude that agent 𝑗 cannot reduce the cost of her
path in 𝐺𝑖.
We have shown that the cost of agent 𝑗 cannot decrease after the deviation, which contradicts
the assumption that the deviation is profitable. Therefore, 𝑟 is a SE.
In the proof, we assumed that the source node 𝑠 is the source node of 𝐺1. If 𝑠 is the source
node of another subnetwork 𝐺𝑖, the subnetworks 𝐺1, . . . , 𝐺𝑖−1 are never used by any agent and can
be ignored. If 𝑠 is an inner node of subnetwork 𝐺𝑖, all the possible paths of all agents use the same
edges in 𝐺𝑖, and no agent can reduce the cost of her path in 𝐺𝑖.
Proof of Theorem 6.2. We first prove that the networks described in the theorem admit a SE. The
proof is very similar to that of Theorem 6.1. Assume that 𝐺 = 𝐺1 → 𝐺2 → . . . → 𝐺𝑘, where 𝐺𝑙
is a network of parallel paths and 𝐺1, . . . , 𝐺𝑙−1, 𝐺𝑙+1, . . . , 𝐺𝑘 are networks of parallel edges. Let Δ
be a multi-source game played on 𝐺.
As in the proof of Theorem 6.1, the source and sink nodes of each agent define which of the
subnetworks 𝐺1, . . . , 𝐺𝑘 are used as part of her path. If the source or sink node of an agent is an
inner node of 𝐺𝑙, there is only one path in 𝐺𝑙 that reaches that node and the agent must use it.
In this proof, we assume that the agents are ordered in a way that agents whose source or sink
node is an inner node of 𝐺𝑙 come after all other agents. Formally, if 𝑗1 is an agent that both her
source and sink nodes are not inner nodes of 𝐺𝑙, and 𝑗2 is an agent whose source or sink node is
an inner node of 𝐺𝑙, then 𝑗1 < 𝑗2.
We now define a strategy profile 𝑟 and show that it is a SE. The profile 𝑟 is defined in two
steps. First, if agent 𝑗’s source or sink node is an inner node of subnetwork 𝐺𝑙, every possible path
for that agent uses the same edges in 𝐺𝑙, so we assign these edges to the agent. This is only a part
of agent 𝑗’s path, and the rest of her path is determined in the next step. In the next step, we
iterate through the subnetworks 𝐺1, . . . , 𝐺𝑘 (including 𝐺𝑙). When subnetwork 𝐺𝑖 is considered, we
25
Figure 11: SPP networks that do not admit a SE in games with multiple source and sink nodes
determine how many agents need to be assigned a path from the source node to the sink node of
𝐺𝑖, and compute these paths using Algorithm 1. Then, we assign each of the paths returned by
the algorithm to the agents according to their order: The first agent 𝑗1 who needs to be assigned
a path in 𝐺𝑖 gets the lowest-cost path returned by the algorithm. Then, the second agent 𝑗2 > 𝑗1
who needs a path in 𝐺𝑖 is assigned the second lowest-cost path, and so on. This completes the
definition of 𝑟.
We claim that the strategy profile 𝑟 is a SE. Assume by contradiction that there is a coalition
𝐶 that benefits from deviating to another profile, and let 𝑗 be the minimal index of an agent in 𝐶.
Agent 𝑗 can reduce her cost in 𝐺𝑖 by moving to another path, or by sharing the cost of her path
with another agent that deviates to that path. As in the proof of Theorem 3.3, agent 𝑗 cannot
use another path in a profitable deviation, as if there were such a path, the algorithm would have
assigned that path to 𝑗 earlier. So after the deviation, agent 𝑗 must share her path in 𝐺𝑖 with more
agents compared to the original profile 𝑟. There are two cases:
1. Agent 𝑗’s path contains both the source and sink nodes of 𝐺𝑖. In that case, either agent 𝑗’s
path in 𝐺𝑖 has an edge 𝑒 that is used by 𝑐𝑒 agents, or the path is used by agents 𝑗, . . . , 𝑛. If
the path contains an edge 𝑒 that is used by 𝑐𝑒 agents in 𝑟, the path cannot be used by more
than 𝑐𝑒 agents after the deviation. If the path is already used by agents 𝑗, . . . , 𝑛, no other
agents can join the path, since 𝑗 = min𝐶. In both cases, the cost of agent 𝑗 in 𝐺𝑖 does not
decrease.
2. 𝑖 = 𝑙 and agent 𝑗’s source or sink node is an inner node of 𝐺𝑙. In that case, the only agents
who can join agent 𝑗’s path in 𝐺𝑙 are agents whose path contains both the source and sink
nodes of 𝐺𝑙. However, the agents are ordered so that these agents are indexed lower than 𝑗.
These agents do not participate in the deviation, and we conclude that agent 𝑗 cannot reduce
the cost of her path in 𝐺𝑙.
We have shown that the cost of agent 𝑗 cannot decrease after the deviation, which contradicts
the assumption that the deviation is profitable. Therefore, 𝑟 is a SE.
The converse direction relies on previous proofs. For every non-SPP network, we have already
shown that there is a symmetric CFCSC game played on it that has no SE. Epstein et al. [9] have
provided an example of a game with multiple source and sink nodes that is played on the network
depicted in Figure 11(a) and does not admit a SE. An equivalent game can be played on the network
presented in Figure 11(b), by setting the cost of the additional edge to be 0. It is easy to show that
one of the networks of Figure 11 is embedded in every SPP network 𝐺 = 𝐺1 → 𝐺2 → . . .→ 𝐺𝑘 that
at least two of its subnetworks 𝐺1, . . . , 𝐺𝑘 are not networks of parallel edges. By the arguments
used in the proof of Theorem 3.5, it follows that these networks do not admit a SE.
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Proof of Theorem 6.3. Let Δ be a game played on an SPP network 𝐺 such that 𝐺 = 𝐺1 → 𝐺2 →
. . .→ 𝐺𝑘, and let 𝑠 be a SE in Δ. As in the proof of Theorem 4.1, it is sufficient to show that there
is an optimal strategy profile 𝑠*, such that for every coalition of agents 𝐶, the profile (𝑠𝐶 , 𝑠*−𝐶) is
feasible.
Let 𝐺𝑂𝑃𝑇 be the subnetwork of 𝐺 that is used by an optimal solution. We define a strategy
profile 𝑠* that uses edges only from 𝐺𝑂𝑃𝑇 . The source and sink nodes of each agent define which
of the subnetworks 𝐺1, . . . , 𝐺𝑘 are used as part of her path. We iterate through 𝐺1, . . . , 𝐺𝑘, and
for every agent who uses edges from 𝐺𝑖, we define the path in 𝐺𝑖 that this agent uses in 𝑠
*.
First, for each of the parallel paths in 𝐺𝑖 that are used in both 𝑠 and 𝐺𝑂𝑃𝑇 , we assign each path
to the same agents who use it in 𝑠. This includes all the agents whose source or sink node is an
inner node of 𝐺𝑖, who must use a specific path in 𝐺𝑖 in every strategy profile. This does not violate
the capacity constraints due to the feasibility of 𝑠. Then, for the other agents who use 𝐺𝑖 and still
do not have a path, we assign them any available path in 𝐺𝑖 that is part of 𝐺𝑂𝑃𝑇 . Since there is
a feasible strategy profile that uses only edges from 𝐺𝑂𝑃𝑇 , there are enough available paths. This
completes the definition of 𝑠*.
We now prove that for every coalition of agents 𝐶, the profile 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏 = (𝑠𝐶 , 𝑠
*
−𝐶) is feasible.
Let 𝑒 be an edge in 𝐺𝑖. Denote by 𝑀 the set of agents that use 𝑒 in 𝑠, and let 𝑀
* denote the
set of agents that use 𝑒 in 𝑠*. The set of agents that use 𝑒 in 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏 is (𝑀 ∩ 𝐶) ∪ (𝑀* ∩ (𝑁∖𝐶)),
where 𝑁 is the set of all agents. If 𝑒 is used only in 𝑠, it cannot exceed its capacity in 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏, since
𝑀 ∩ 𝐶 ⊆ 𝑀 , and the profile 𝑠 is feasible. The same applies to edges that are used only in 𝑠*. It
remains to consider edges that are used in both 𝑠 and 𝑠*. In the definition of 𝑠*, every agent who
uses the simple path in 𝐺𝑖 that contains 𝑒 in 𝑠 is also assigned the same path in 𝑠
*. It follows that
𝑀 ⊆𝑀*, and (𝑀 ∩ 𝐶) ∪ (𝑀* ∩ (𝑁∖𝐶)) ⊆𝑀*. Since 𝑠* is a feasible solution, we conclude that 𝑒
does not exceed its capacity in 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏. Therefore, 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑏 is feasible.
Proof of Theorem 5.2 for Undirected Graphs. The extension of the theorem to undirected graphs
has two parts. First, we have to show that the SE described in the proof is still a SE. Recall that in
this profile, one agent uses the path (𝑠, 𝑒, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑏, 𝑡) and pays 0.6, and the other agent uses the path
(𝑠, 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑡) and pays 𝑅+1.3. Note that the lowest possible cost an agent can incur is still 0.6, which
means that the agent who pays 0.6 will not participate in a deviation. The other agent cannot
deviate to any path that excludes the edge of cost 𝑅. Hence, the profile is a SE.
Second, we have to show that when the edges are undirected, there are no new SE that exclude
the edge (𝑏, 𝑡) that costs 𝑅. Note that any path in a SE does not contain a cycle that costs more
than 0. We analyze the strategy profiles that use edges in the opposite direction in order to look
for new SE.
Using any of the edges that are adjacent to the source or the sink in the opposite direction
results in a cycle of non-zero cost. Hence, this cannot occur in a SE.
Any path that uses the edge (𝑐, 𝑒) (in that direction) either contains the edge (𝑒, 𝑡) or the edge
(𝑒, 𝑠). If an agent uses both (𝑐, 𝑒) and (𝑒, 𝑡), the edge (𝑠, 𝑒) cannot be used by the other agent, and
deviating to the path (𝑠, 𝑒, 𝑡) is profitable. If the path of an agent contains the subpath (𝑐, 𝑒, 𝑠),
the path must contain a cycle, which is impossible in a SE.
Any feasible profile in which an agent uses one of the edges (𝑏, 𝑎), (𝑐, 𝑎), or (𝑑, 𝑐) (in these
directions) must contain a cycle that costs more than 0.
Finally, the only feasible profile without cycles in which the edge (𝑏, 𝑑) is used (in that direction)
contains the two paths (𝑠, 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑑, 𝑡) and (𝑠, 𝑒, 𝑡). The costs of the paths are 1.8 and 1, respectively,
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and the agents can benefit by deviating to another profile, such as (𝑠, 𝑎, 𝑐, 𝑑, 𝑡) and (𝑠, 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝑡). We
get that every SE must use the edge that costs 𝑅 (and 𝑅 can be arbitrarily high).
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